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Hindutva’s Blood
Dwaipayan Banerjee and Jacob Copeman
1 Like  many  other  nationalist  movements,  Hindu  nationalism  “understand[s]  and
order[s] the world through ‘cultural essentials’ of religion, blood, and other practices
related to the body—food, marriage, death” (Hansen 1999:11). In what follows, we focus
particularly  on  how  blood  as  a  political  substance  of  Hindu  nationalism  congeals
ideology  in  material  forms.  Specifically,  we  trace  how  blood  is  imagined  and
exteriorized  by  Hindutva  leaders  and  adherents:  in  ideological  texts,  in  donation
camps,  through  the  offering  of  activists’  own  blood  to  political  figures,  in  blood-
portraiture  of  political  figures,  and  in  bloodshed  during  episodes  of  communal
violence. 
2 Tracing these imaginations and exteriorizations, we identify three ways in which blood
has become a medium and conceptual resource for Hindutva practice. First, we trace
how Hindu nationalist ideologues equate blood with the nation’s spatial boundaries,
demanding that non-Hindus recognize an ancient,  essential  blood-tie and assimilate
back into the Hindu fold.  Second, we identify how blood authorizes and legitimizes
contemporary acts of Hindu nationalist violence, even as it draws upon existing self-
understandings of Hindu non-violence and self-sacrifice. And third, we trace how blood
becomes a medium for a retroactive writing of Hindu nationalism into Indian history
and the anti-colonial struggle. Across these three strategies, we find a Hindutva politics
that produces an essentialized, divisive hematic continuum. By equating the region’s
past, present and future with Hindu blood, Hindutva ideologues establish spatial and
temporal continuities between Hindu nationalism and Indian history and geography.
Finally, we offer some brief thoughts on how our considerations of the substance have
coalesced in the current Indian government’s passage of the Citizenship Amendment
Act  (CAA)  and  also  in  discourses  and  practices  around  the  Covid-19  pandemic.  As
Hindutva groups continue to frame the question of citizenship as a matter of a deep
historical essentialism, the idea of a shared community of blood legitimizes the linking
of  consanguinity  with  geographic  boundaries.  Similarly,  the  fraught  communal
undertones of the idea of donating and spilling blood have become inescapably salient
in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. These revivifications are only the most recent
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iterations  of  a  long  history  of  how  blood  has  continued  to  lend  material  force  to
shifting configurations of political practice and metaphor.
3 It  is  an  obvious  but  important  point  that  Hindutva  imaginations  of  blood  have  to
negotiate  and  reckon with  prior  meanings  and  mobilizations  of  the  substance.  For
example, one particularly significant enactment of blood is its work in marking caste
boundaries. In our earlier work, we traced how religious, rationalist,  environmental
and  anti-caste  activists  differently  deploy  blood  as  a  metaphor  and  medium,
recognizing the substance’s ability to mark difference, while simultaneously aspiring to
reconfigure  it  as  a  site  of  consanguinity  and  reform  (Banerjee  and  Copeman 2018;
Copeman and Banerjee 2019).1 In that work, we argued that such performances of the
transgression of  prior  logics—including those of  caste—do not  always unravel  their
hierarchies, but often maintain and reproduce them. This logic recurs in this paper, as
Hindutva ideologues seek to elide caste hierarchies and appropriate radical anti-caste
visions by discursively espousing a commonality of blood amongst all Hindus. Such an
elision obscures the strength of interdictions against the mixing of caste blood. That is,
by suggesting an easy already-existing conceptual commonality, Hindutva ideologues
reject more radical anti-caste visions, such as those of B.R. Ambedkar, who proposed
inter-caste  marriages  as  a  critical  response  to  the  symbolic  power  of  endogamous
reproduction (Ambedkar 2014:499). In this paper, we understand this elision of caste as
an absented-presence, demonstrative of how Hindutva actors themselves obfuscate the
movement’s  complicity  with  upper  caste  power.  Further  ethnographic  analysis  of
Hindutva practices of caste-reproduction through blood logics (that which is absented
in Hindutva’s self-presentation) lies outside the scope of this paper.
 
Hematic Substrates
Blood Will Always Out
4 Scholarly accounts of the many strands of Hindu nationalism trace its emphasis on
Hindu blood back to the writings of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, and in particular to his
seminal work on Hindu identity published in 1923: Hindutva—Who Is a Hindu? Indeed,
the treatise quickly gained in status to become the major twentieth century reference
point for the ideological advancement of Hindu nationalism (Chaturvedi 2003:169). As
the  editor’s  introduction to  the  fifth  edition  of  Hindutva  explains,  “the  concept  of
Hindutva is Savarkar’s own…[it stipulates that] the Hindus are tied together by bonds
of a common fatherland, ties of  blood, a common culture and civilization,  common
heroes,  common  history  and  above  all,  the  will  to  remain  united  as  a  nation”
(Chaturvedi 2003:169). Central to Savarkar’s definition of Hindu as an ethno-nationalist
category  are  the  requirements  that  one’s  holy  land  must  lie  within  India  (thereby
excluding those who look to Mecca, Palestine, or Rome) and possession of the Aryan-
Harappan  bloodline  (Gittinger 2011:25).  As  John  Zavos (1999)  explains,  Savarkar’s
operationalization of blood formed part of a wider Hindu nationalist strategy at the
time  that  rejected  the  eradication  of  untouchability,  instead  promoting  “broad
signifiers  of  the  Hindu  community  as  a  means  of  encompassing  a  pluriformity  of
religious and cultural identities” (P. 73). Untouchability was not to be eliminated but
encompassed,  and  jati was  to  be  a  touchstone  of  unity  rather  than  division
(Zavos 1999:73): 
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The very castes which you, owing to your colossal failure to understand and
view them in the right perspective, assert to have barred the common flow
of  blood into  our  race,  have  done so  more  truly  and more  effectively  as
regards the foreign blood than our own. Nay is  not the very presence of
these present castes a standing testimony to a common flow of blood from a
Brahman to a Chandal? (Savarkar 2003:30).
In this, way Savarkar claimed that the caste system was not evidence of hierarchy, but
rather  an innocent  outcome of  ancient  inter-marriages,  the  products  of  which had
multiplied  caste  groups  throughout  history.  The  present  caste  system  then  was
evidence not  of  an original  difference,  but  rather,  of  an over-riding ancient  blood-
community.
5 If  Savarkar’s utilization of jati as a signifier of unity and his reasoning about inter-
marriages is confounding, so is his justification of the breaking of caste rules rendering
members ‘outcaste’: “Being outcast from a caste, which is an event of daily occurrence,
is  only  getting  incorporated  with  some  other”  (Savarkar 1989:88).  In  this  way,  as
Zavos (1999:74) explains, Savarkar was able to argue for “the overriding commonality
of  Hindu  blood.”  Indeed,  Savarkar  repeatedly  stated  that  the  racial  inheritance  of
Hindu blood was  the  most  important  characteristic  of  Hindutva (Bhatt 2001:95;  see
Savarkar 1989:90; 110). The substance bound together past and present Hindus not just
biologically, but also affectively.
We are not only a Nation but a Jati, a born brotherhood. Nothing else counts,
it is after all a question of heart. We feel that the same ancient blood that
coursed through the veins of Ram and Krishna, Buddha and Mahavir, Nanak
and  Chaitanya,  Basava  and  Madhva,  of  Rohidas  and  Tiruvelluvar  courses
throughout Hindudom from vein to vein, pulsates from heart to heart. We
feel we are a JATI, a race bound together by the dearest ties of blood and
therefore it must be so. (Savarkar 1989:89–90) 
Discussing Savarkar’s emphasis on the emotional resonances of “Hindu blood,” Chetan
Bhatt (2001) notes how entangling affect and blood was a “paradigmatic example of the
necessity of emotional mobilization as central to any ontology of race formation and
racial affiliation” (Pp. 95–6). Blood was a powerful bind because according to Savarkar
one could lose one’s caste, “but never one’s Hindutva since, the blood would always out
and manifest itself as an affective structure in which Hindus would sense their racial
affiliation to their ancestors, and hence to all Hindus” (Bhatt 2001:96, emphasis ours). 
6 But at the same time, if Hindutva imagined a (non-consensual) incorporation of lower
castes,  Indian  Muslims  tested  blood’s  ability  to  assimilate  difference.  That  is,  if
untouchables were assimilable because of a shared biosocial tie they had supposedly
not  relinquished,  the  allegiance  of  Indian  Muslims  to  a  non-Hindu  holy  land
fundamentally compromised them, even if their blood was also originally Hindu. As
Savarkar (1989) explains: “The story of [their conversions to Islam], forcible in millions
of cases, is too recent to make them forget, even if they like to do so, that they inherit
Hindu blood in their veins.” Despite this, “it is clear that though their original Hindu
blood is  thus almost  unaffected by an alien adulteration,  yet  they cannot be called
Hindus” (Pp. 91). That is, unless: “Ye, who by race, by blood, by culture, by nationality,
possess  almost  all  the  essentials  of  Hindutva…render  whole-hearted  love  to  our
common Mother and recognise her not only as Fatherland (Pitribhu) but even as a
Holyland (Punyabhu); and ye would be most welcome to the Hindu fold” (P. 115). 
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7 In a fascinating reading of Hindutva’s alimentary politics,  Jyotirmaya Sharma (2009)
describes how early Hindutva ideologues imagined precisely this process of literally
incorporating Muslims—who shared Hindu blood but yet refused assimilation into a
Hindu holy land. For example, Sharma describes how in retrospective writings about
his  imprisonment,  Savarkar  criticized  his  fellow  Hindu  inmates  for  refusing  food
offered by non-Hindus, alleging that Muslims not only took but snatched food from
Hindu communities. In response, Savarkar urged Hindus to, in turn, cultivate their own
communal  power to  digest  and incorporate  the  Muslim other.  Sharma then details
Savarkar’s imagination of assimilation through bodily incorporation, as it manifests in
a  series  of  Savarkar’s  poems  celebrating  Hindu  deities  defeating  demonic  Muslim
enemies.  In  these  poems,  Savarkar  created  an  imaginative  world  in  which  Hindu
warriors  fed their  hunger  with the  body of  Muslims,  bathing themselves  and their
motherland in the other’s blood (Pp. 163–4).2 Thus, blood operates in Savarkar’s writing
as evidence of an original Hindu-Muslim consanguinity, at the same time as it portends
violence and death if  Muslims do not give themselves over for incorporation into a
Hindu body politic. This metaphoric doubling of blood is sharpened in the writings of
M.S. Golwalkar, the second leader of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), gaining
particular salience in the aftermath of the partition of India.3 Like Savarkar, Golwalkar
argued that even if Indian Muslims’ allegiance to a foreign land compromised them,
their original, shared blood tie with Hindus could serve as a conduit for their re-entry
into a Hindutva fold, as long as they relinquished their recent conversions and new
beliefs.  However,  as  with  Savarkar,  inclusion  slips  easily  into  accusation.  Echoing
Savarkar, Golwalkar described the creation of Pakistan as an act of Muslims literally
eating the Hindu body politic, the only response to which was for Hindus to regain
their capacity for digesting outsiders (Sharma 2009:150–1). Thus, if Muslims needed to
be reminded that “we are all one people and it is the same blood that courses in our
veins [...]” (Golwalkar cited in Ahmed 2017), such a reminder could only be issued if
Hindus reacquainted themselves with a hunger for blood and sacrifice.
8 The influence of this brand of hematic reasoning remains strong today, when shared
blood continues to delegitimize Muslim beliefs  and difference,  leading to threats of
their  violent  re-incorporation  into  a  Hindu  fold.  The  present  RSS  leader  Mohan
Bhagwat recently reiterated that “Muslims in India must realise that their forefathers
were Hindus, who eventually converted to Islam” (Golwalkar cited in Ahmed 2017). And
it is entirely conventional in mainstream Indian political discourse to encounter claims
such as those made by the former RSS leader K. Sudarshan that: “The blood flowing in
the veins of Indian Muslims is the same as Lord Rama and Krishna…in a true sense, both
Lord  Rama  and  Krishna  are  ancestors  of  Indian  Muslims.”4 This  common  political
parlance insists upon inclusiveness. Former Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez
(a Christian), for example, declares that “I look at a Pakistani as the flesh of our flesh
and the blood of our blood.”5 A former leader of the RSS-affiliated Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) similarly asserted that “Muslims are the flesh of our flesh and the blood of
our blood but they never got their rightful share in the nation’s development[…].”6 The
incorporative-digestive politics of Savarkar and Gowalkar thus continues to find new
articulations, recomposed for contemporary circumstances.
9 As  Savarkar  and  Golwalkar  made  clear,  such  seemingly  inclusive  and  assimilative
rhetoric insinuates that if Indian Muslims do not accede to this recognition of a Hindu
biological substrate, they become legitimate targets of violence. After the catastrophic
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communal  violence  of  2002  in  Gujarat,  the  Vishwa  Hindu  Parishad  (VHP)  leader
Praveen Togadia is reported to have declared that “India’s Muslims should submit to
genetic tests. Since the forefathers of Muslims are Hindus, how can the blood of Arabia
flow in their blood? I advise all Muslims to get tested for their Hindu origin.”7 Religion
ceases to refer either to belief or practice, but simply to blood; the blood of Arabia does
not  flow in their  veins,  they are “mere” converts.  This  hematic  vision of  Hindutva
resembles what has been identified as the medicalization of  kinship through which
“Biomedicine  insists  on  uniting  those  who  may  not  choose  to  be  connected”
(Finkler 2001:239). Blood, in such conceptions, holds and fixes a set of connections, with
the VHP leader turning to biomedicine and blood tests in order to attempt to enforce
coercive inclusion. Hindutva rhetoric relies on the idea that one cannot be displaced
from one’s original “nature,” located in and revealed by the blood. In this appeal to
blood  as  consummate  repository  of  indisputable  knowledge,  the  body  appears
paradoxically  as  both  prior  to  and  the  locus  of  religion.  “Prior”  in  the  sense  that
biomedical  examination  of  the  bodies  of  Muslims  reveals  that  they  are  in  fact  not
Muslims, and “locus” in the sense that it is in bodies that religion is nonetheless to be
found.
10 In  2002  The  Milli  Gazette,  which  styles  itself  as  Indian  Muslims’  leading  English
newspaper, prefaced an interview with Togadia with an intriguingly positive take on
blood ties as the locus of a hopeful future:
Dr Pravin Togadia comes from the noble profession of healing and professes
to be a believer in the nobler ideas of Hinduism. Yet, he would not pause for
a moment before making uncharitable remarks against Islam and Muslims.
He holds Indian Muslims responsible for atrocities in Pakistan, Bangladesh
and, in the same breath, Kashmir. That, to him, is justification enough for the
two-month-long Gujarat carnage. Distribution of a million trishuls at kumbh,
followed by similar trishul-distribution campaigns at other places in India,
fire  arms training to  Bajrang Dal  cadres  and repeated attacks  on Muslim
passengers  in  Sabarmati  Express  (pre-designed  to  provoke  a  dangerous
conflict)  by  VHP  storm-troopers  in  days  preceding  Godhra,  which  have
brought the country to the precipice,  do not bother him at all.  However,
there is still a silver lining in the darkness of hate: Dr Togadia does recognise
the shared ancestry of  Indian Muslims and Hindus.  All  of  us  know that  blood is
thicker than water, and a day might come when this burning rage fuelled by angry
people like Dr Togadia would cool down and blood ties would reassert themselves
(our emphasis).8 
Recall  Togadia’s  statement  that  India’s  Muslims  must  have  their  blood  tested  to
demonstrate that “the blood of Arabia” does not flow in them. What is divisive in his
speech—a means of underscoring a putative Islamic aberration (deviance from blood)
as  a  justification  for  persecution—is  instead  taken  by  the  editors  of  the  Milli
Gazette (2002)  as  indicative of  a  divorce  between  code  (the  moral,  normative)  and
substance (blood) that may only be temporary: for “a day might come” when “blood ties
would reassert themselves.” If for Togadia the proper biomorality of blood is grounded
in an original Hindu-ness, for the editors of the Milli Gazette, the recognition of a shared
blood implies the legitimacy of difference, both past and present. 
11 In employing the terms “substance” and “code” here we refer to the work of kinship
theorist  David  Schneider  as  employed  by  McKim  Marriott.  In  Schneider’s (1980)
analysis, American kinship was a symbolic system resting on the two contrasting but
mutually dependent elements of shared biogenetic substance (blood) and social code
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(contractual  love  that  legitimated  and  reproduced  blood  ties).  Contrarily,  Marriott
argued that in Indian kinship, “substance” (blood) did not oppose “code” (the moral,
normative),  but all  aspects of reality were natural and moral at the same time. For
instance, caste boundaries continue to be maintained through restrictions on who eats
and drinks with whom. Yet Marriott’s ethnosociology has come under criticism for the
inflexibility and ahistoricity of its analysis—the result of which was to mistake norm for
practice.  Our  own  approach,  developed  in  our  wider  work  (Copeman  and
Banerjee 2019),  is  to  argue  for  the  continued  usefulness  of  Marriott’s  schematic
categories,  but  only  if  they  are  detached  from  an  ahistorical,  rule-bound  and
exclusively Hindu universe, and the Milli Gazette piece is a case in point. Marriott (1976)
states  that  code  and  substance  “cannot  have  separate  existences  in  [the]  world  of
constituted things as conceived by most South Asians” (Pp. 110).” But it is precisely
their separate existences that come into focus in the disagreement between Togadia
and the editors of the Milli Gazette. Both sides present contrasting visions of what the
proper relation between code and substance should be: Togadia stresses an essential
blood-tie  that  is  prior  to  and  erases  contemporary  religious  difference,  while  the
editors legitimize and authorize religious difference through an invocation of the same
blood-tie. For the editors, the present scenario (the piece was written soon after the
massacres of Muslims in Gujarat) is marked by bloodshed, not blood ties. Their hope in
these times of political division is that substance and code might be reunited. Even
amidst devastating bloodshed, hematic visions of substantial community retain their
power.
12 Crucially, the editors’ vision of reuniting substance and code is undercut by Togadia in
the interview that  follows the  preface:  “all  Hindus  and Muslims should accept  one
reality—that we are ethnically and culturally the same. No one from the Hindu-Muslim
society must suffer German-Jew paradigm. Each and every Muslim of India emanates
ancestorily  from  the  gene,  RBC,  bone,  blood  and  flesh  of  a  Hindu.”  The  Gazette’s
reconciliatory  gesture  toward  a  future  where  substance-code  may  be  reunited  is
compromised by Togadia’s assertion of the prior purity of Hindu blood, a norm from
which Muslim blood can only deviate. Here, then, shared blood takes the form of an
accusation. It signifies only deviation and aberrancy.
13 But the idiom is flexible. For instance, Sangh Parivar activists in northeast India who
are seeking to recruit local traditions, including Christian ones, into their vision of a
greater  Hindu  nation  reference  shared  blood  less  as  accusation  and  more  as
exhortation. Arkotong Longkumer (2017:213) reports the hematic refrain employed by
members  of  the  Kalyan Ashram,  an RSS offshoot,  as  they relegate  both indigenous
religions  and  Christianity  to  a  status  of  mere  belief:  “In  emphasising  the  common
‘Hindu’ identity that is beyond mere ‘worship,’  the goal of the Kalyan Ashram is to
stress that ‘Nagas are our blood brothers’ and by extension part of [a] Hindu orbit that
is familial, territorial, and civilizational.” Importantly, such a demarcation of Hinduism
that  foregrounds  nationalist  “blood  and  soil”  is  sanctioned  by  Indian  law.  Rupa
Viswanath (2014:144–45)  cites  Derrett (1968:52),  who explains  that  “the legal  test  of
whether a person is a Hindu...starts with ethnic and geographical tests, which...can be
rebutted not by proof of absence of belief or presence of disbelief but only by proof of
exclusive adherence (or conversion) to a foreign (i.e. a non-Hindu) faith.” Which is to
say, as Viswanath (2014) puts it, that “anyone practising or professing anything at all,
so  long  as  she  refrains  from  explicitly  adhering  to  Christianity  or  Islam—even  a
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committed atheist—is, legally speaking, a Hindu” (P. 145). Fascinatingly, Longkumer’s
Hindutva activist informants in the northeast suggest that even explicit adherents of
Christianity (though not of Islam) may retain membership of the Hindu fold, because of
their hemato-civilizational substrate. 
 
“May Allah help RSS to grow”
14 The RSS’  preoccupation with  blood is  more  than conceptual,  it  flows  into  material
forms: for example, the organization runs several blood banks, and the movement’s
auto-hagiographies accord them a privileged place. One RSS publication notes that “the
RSS runs many blood banks,  and the director of  the Pune-based unit  served as the
Secretary  General  of  the  Indian Society  of  Blood Transfusion Units.  The  RSS  blood
banks conduct public  education programs on blood donation as  well and distribute
literature on AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases.”9 The phenomenon is visible as
much in the diaspora as at home: “when there was a major fire explosion in a factory
near Kuala Lumpur many HSS volunteers were pleasantly surprised to see that many
swayamsewak brothers from other shakhas had come to government hospital to donate
blood.  All  these  happened  spontaneously  without  any  word  from
adhikaris”  (Kumar 2017:80).10 Meanwhile,  another  Hindutva-inspired  tract  describes
blood donation drives “carried out [by the RSS and its close affiliates] on the occasion
of  Mahatma  Gandhi  Jayanti  in  Hong  Kong,  Sydney,  Melbourne,  Auckland,  Kuala
Lumpur, Bangkok etc.” (Kumar 2017:80; 81). As Gwilym Beckerlegge (2015:226) explains,
it was the second RSS supremo M.S. Golwalkar who placed great emphasis on “selfless
service” activities partially as a means of rehabilitating the RSS after its proscription in
the aftermath of Gandhi’s assassination. It is interesting to note how those same seva
activities  now  reach  out  to  remember  and  enfold  the  very  icon  whose  killing’s
association with the RSS they were instituted, in part, to draw a veil over.
15 RSS blood donation camps allow the organization to portray itself as an integrative
force, an exemplar of selflessness and inclusion. Its patriotic blood collection is for the
good  of  the  whole  nation;  they  “make  no  religious  distinction  in  such  matters”
(Seshadri 1998:211). A story used to illustrate this tenet of RSS ideology relates to a
Muslim man in  Chennai  who  needed  blood  for  his  ten-year-old  daughter  who was
undergoing surgery:
He  approached  his  relatives  for  blood  who  did  not  oblige.  The  others
demanded Rs. 300 per bottle which he could not afford. When the Muslim
gentleman reported his predicament to the surgeon, himself a Christian, he
advised him to approach the RSS workers… On his approaching the Sangh
Karyalaya [the local RSS branch], he was immediately assured of help and six
bottles of blood were procured on the day of operation. After the operation
he wrote a letter to the Sangh Karyalaya saying, ‘Indeed you gave life to my
daughter. May Allah help RSS to grow.’ (Seshadri 1998:211)
16 Former RSS Vice-President H.V. Seshadri’s recounting of the episode is revealing of the
starkly double-edged nature of the RSS’s inclusiveness. If it is employed to demonstrate
how swayamsevaks make no religious distinction, the episode as recounted here marks a
distinction between those who are willing to donate the substance (Hindus) and those
who decline to do so (Muslims); between those who are willing to transcend and to
donate their blood across religious divides in the cause of a common humanity (Hindus)
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and those unwilling to donate even for one of their own (Muslims); between those who
donate selflessly without seeking a return (Hindus) and those who will donate only for
commercial gain (Muslims).11 In this way, an act claiming to transcend divisions in fact
serves  to  mark  them  further.  Even  a  Christian  surgeon,  belonging  to  another
community  whose patriotic  loyalties  are  to  be  suspected,  acknowledges  the selfless
service of the swayamsevaks.  A Delhi-based RSS volunteer and pamphleteer who has
conducted stints coordinating its seva activities in the capital echoed Seshadri’s words
in explaining to us the
civilizational gap between Hindus and Muslims. Though they are the blood of
our blood, flesh of our flesh, there is a wild difference in sentimentality. For
Muslims there is—there can be—no diversity. Hindus are for diversity, and
they will  donate  their  blood for  Muslims;  but  with Muslims it  is  not  the
same…What is their idea? I don’t know. They are secluding themselves and it
is a self-made seclusion.
Hindus, then, will donate blood for Muslims (“the blood of our blood”), but not the
other way around. In this way, the Hindu blood donation comes to mirror and reify the
prior tie or flow—the biological substrate that marks India as a Hindu nation. 
17 To  elaborate,  subtly  present  in  Seshadri’s  retelling  are  sentiments  that  recall  the
teachings  of  Savarkar  and Golwalkar  about  the  common (Hindu)  blood that  India’s
Hindus and Muslims share. If it is a longstanding Hindu nationalist trope to ask the
Muslim to recall that “you also belong to the same race as ours, to the same blood of
ours” (Golwalkar 2000:122),  blood donation from Hindus to Muslims establishes this
trope in practice. That is, the Hindu blood donation mobilizes the constitutive force of
blood as the (metaphoric) substance of the already existing racial tie binding Muslims
and Hindus, which is literalized by way of what becomes an exterior mirroring of a
prior interior connection.12 But rather than a literalization or reminder of shared blood
under a Hindu sign, what the episode recounted by Seshadri and others like it suggests
is instead a further hematic distinction: for if Hindutva groups insist on a shared Hindu
and Muslim blood, the division between them is reasserted in Muslims’ alleged refusal
to acknowledge this fact.
 
Swadeshi blood
18 Dr. Keshav Hedgewar, who founded the RSS in 1925 and is often referred to by his
followers as “Doctorji,” is intimately tied to contemporary Hindutva symbolics of blood
donation.  Writing  of  Hedgewar—“the  Hindu  ideal  of  man  in  flesh  and  blood”—
Golwalkar (2000)  describes  the  particular  temporality  of  his  life-as-sacrifice:
Hedgewar’s sacrifice, unlike those who “sacrifice their lives in a flash of martyrdom,”
“was  a  steady  and  consuming  fire  stretched  over  the  entire  period  of  his  youth.”
Indeed, “to burn oneself every moment of one’s life in order to light up countless other
hearts is a tapasya [austerity] of the highest order” (P. 354). But he did not just burn, his
blood was drained, and his body cut open for the nation: 
Like Shibi of the olden days Doctorji cut his own flesh bit by bit in order to
protect the ‘dove’ of society. Like Dadhichi, who gave his bones to be forged
into a deadly weapon to slay the demon Vritasura,  Doctorji  too smilingly
transfused  his  life-blood  to  society  till  the  last  drop.  That  was  how
Shankaracharya died at  the age of  thirty-two, Vivekananda at thirty-nine
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and Shivaji at fifty. Doctorji too died at fifty. And it is they who live eternally!
(Golwalkar 2000:354)
It is appropriate, then, that the most notable of several RSS blood banks is named after
Dr Hedgewar. Based in Nagpur, it has as its slogan “For the sake of the nation, we must
donate our blood.” The bank seeks explicitly to differentiate itself from other more
dominant organizations in the country—especially the Red Cross, which dominates the
landscape of blood donation in Delhi and other major metropolitan centers. A Delhi-
based RSS representative of the Dr Hedgewar Blood Bank told us that “blood donation
in India till now has been based on Christian humanitarian ethics, especially when you
look at the Red Cross, but this blood bank is inspired by Hindu ethics of sacrifice as
taught in the Vedas.”  Similarly,  each of  the swayamsevaks we spoke with about the
blood bank was quick to contrast its ethos with that of the Indian Red Cross. We were
told that “the Red Cross Society is a Christian concept. It is not Hindu. It comes from
Europe, which is Christian. We like the Red Cross. A sense of humanism is invoked, so
we co-operate. But blood donation should not be commercialized, and it should not be
an elite concept.” Another swayamsevak elaborated on the matter of commercialism:
There  is  a  danger  of  blood  donation  camps  being  globalized  and
commercialized. If  we have a surplus then maybe we can export to other
countries, but we do not. In addition to sacrifice, anti-commercialization is a
Hindu concept. Serving and saving humanity is our first and last duty as a
human being. In Hinduism there is, number one, a sense of sacrifice, and,
number two, a sense of global brotherhood. It is a Christian concept that the
whole  world  is  a  market.  First  the  Christian  west  colonized  the world
militarily,  and  now  it  is  through  economics  that  it  colonizes—they
commercialize  everything.  Commercialism  penetrates  our  land.  The
resilience of our country to imports and commercialism is important. We can
resist by creating alternatives. The Red Cross does a good job in many ways,
but it cannot have a social sensitivity. The Dr Hedgewar Blood Bank, on the
other hand, creates a sense of participation of the people. It is a blood store
for the most common, ordinary people.13
The Red Cross is thus characterized as a foreign hand signifying commercialism and the
potential export of Indian blood under a Christian sign. It does not have, indeed as a
foreign import, cannot have “a social sensitivity.” The Dr. Hedgewar Blood Bank, on the
other hand,  is  neo-swadeshi  nationalist  and communitarian.  The volunteer does not
state explicitly that Red Cross Society blood banks are commercial enterprises, and let
us be clear, they are not. Delhi’s Red Cross blood bank, alongside government hospital
blood banks, is the least commercial blood bank in the city.14 It is, of course, much less
its actions than its provenance in the commercial Christian west that makes it suspect:
the problem is the “cross” in Red Cross and also its rootless “globalism.” We can think
here  of  the  Hindu  Right’s  “broader  critique  of  the  rise  of  non-government
organizations  and  their  dangerous  ability…to  wrest  effective  sovereignty  from  the
nation” (Cohen 2008:42). No evidence is offered of the “Christian commercialism” of
the Red Cross; it is guilty simply by association and by virtue of its name. Similarly in
respect of the reference to exporting Indian blood, no hard accusation is made; just an
insinuation  that  is  redolent  of  Golwalkar’s (2000:159)  complaint  concerning  the
Christian modus operandi in foreign climes: “Jesus had called upon his followers to give
their all to the poor, the ignorant and the downtrodden. But what have his followers
done in practice? Wherever they have gone, they have proved to be not ‘blood-givers’
but ‘bloodsuckers.’”
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19 It was in an interview with another swayamsevak affiliated with the RSS blood bank that
the subtleties of the accusation of commerce became more apparent. The volunteer
began with a commonplace concerning the genius of Hindu charity: 
When Hindus give there is no intention to get anything in return—we give
wholeheartedly. In the Dr. Hedgewar Blood Bank, it is like this. While we are
donating blood, we do not see which caste, religion or creed the recipient is.
We just donate the blood—we ask for nothing and we do not know anything.”
Without prompting, he then proceeded to compare this Hindu approach with that of
the Red Cross: 
If anyone is needy, we donate. We need no favor for this. Sacrifice is in our
blood. A mother serves and nourishes her son, and the son doesn’t pay her
anything. Hindu service for others is like that between mother and son. The
Red Cross does a lot  in blood banking,  a  lot.  But it  is  a  different kind of
service.  When  a  nurse  serves  a  sick  person,  she  takes  money  –  it  is  a
commercial  service.  In  Christianity  the  world  is  only  perfect  when  it  is
Christian. In Hinduism all human beings are perfect in themselves so there is
no need to change anyone. Therefore, service doesn’t need a return.
While the insinuation here that the Red Cross has commercialized and corrupted blood
banking is  baseless,  the swayamsevaks’  accusations are nonetheless  revelatory about
Hindutva’s hematic imagination. For Hindutva activists, as we have seen, medical blood
donation is inseparable from understandings of blood as the substance of kinship and
material  substrate  sustaining  ethnic  and religious  differences.  Such  understandings
come  together  in  a  unique  conjunction  with  the  Hindutva  variant  of  the  swadeshi 
movement, which criticizes “foreign” elements such as the Red Cross in India partly
from an economic nationalist standpoint. Originally a Gandhian anti-colonial strategy,
the RSS resuscitated swadeshi in  the form of  the Swadeshi  Jagaran Manch pressure
group in 1991 as a response to contemporaneous government policies of deregulation
and privatization.15 The accusation of commercialism and an espoused commitment to
an anti-globalist agenda acts as a surrogate for a further accusation; viz. that Christian
service  can  never  be  separated  from  that  religion’s  conversion  agenda.  Christian
service can only ever take the form of a commercial transaction; it enacts a commerce
in souls.16 
20 Thus,  on  the  one  hand  Hindutva  workers  accuse  Christians  of  seeking  to  convert
inhabitants  of  a  country  who are  all  originally  Hindu,  tied  together  by  an  ancient
blood-tie. On the other, they find commerce as the underlying motive of this impulse to
convert. In response, they propose a swadeshi purification of the originally Hindu body
politic.  In this light,  the role of  the Dr.  Hedgewar Blood Bank comes to look like a
biomedical equivalent of the shuddhi reconversion/purification rituals performed by
much older prototype Hindu nationalist groups. Though the Hindu Right intensified its
rhetoric about demographic threats from minority communities in the 1990s, the trope
itself and attendant forms of reasoning and propaganda have their origin in the late
nineteenth-century anti-  and re-conversion activities of the Arya Samaj and related
Hindu revivalist and reform movements (Bhatt 2001:21; see also Beckerlegge 2015:216–
7).  In  the  contemporary  iteration  of  demographic  strengthening  and  purification
through a literal hematic re-incorporation, blood plays a crucial role. And as the work
of the Hedgewar Blood Bank makes clear,  blood banks themselves must be brought
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back from under the sign of the cross into the Hindu fold: a container of swadeshi blood
must be contained in a swadeshi blood bank. 
21 The  synthesis  of  such  logics  found  their  clearest  expression  in  2008  when  a
Maharashtrian  guru  with  close  links  to  the  Hindu  Janajagruti  Samiti  (see
Anderson 2015)  was  reported  to  have  marked  his  readmission  of  “309  persons…to
Hindu Dharma” by means of a blood donation camp.17 Recall that readmission to the
Hindu fold involves recollecting that one possesses Hindu blood (the problem, as framed
by Savarkar and Golwalkar, is precisely the hematic memory lapse of Indian Christians
and Muslims).  Once more we witness the mirroring of  flow that forms the logic  of
hematic literalization: a common interior blood flow, recollected and acknowledged in
the act of readmission, made visible and mirrored in exterior flows. If Savarkar and
Golwalkar worked to establish a deep, ancient blood tie that marked the subcontinent’s
inhabitants  as  originally  Hindu,  contemporary  blood  banks  continue  their  mission,
working through blood as a material form in order to erase difference, or at least make
difference  deviant.  Blood  flows  through  and  across  donation  events  and  camps,
working simultaneously at conceptual and material registers to integrate those who
have deviated from an original  blood-tie back into the Hindutva fold.  At times and
towards some groups,  the Hindutva will  to re-establish an equation between Hindu
blood and land takes the form of exhortations to reform. At other times and towards
other groups presumed to have deviated too far from the original blood-tie, this drive
to purity manifests in violent threats of erasure.
 
Mediating Violence and Non-Violence
Hematic Virility 
22 Historically,  another  way  that  Indian  Muslims  have  been  marked  as  pathologically
different through blood is for their alleged inclination towards bloodshed. This Muslim
propensity towards bloodshed serves as a foil to descriptions of Hindus nobly averse to
shedding blood.  For example,  vaids (Indian Brahmin healers)  in the early twentieth
century employed the relative hematic propensities of Ayurvedic medicine (coded as
Hindu) to delegitimize Unani traditions (coded as Islamic). Rachel Berger presents the
case of the influential pandit and vaid Shaligram Shastri, whose 1931 report for United
Provinces government officials described Unani in macabre terms as preoccupied with
hemorrhaging or bloodletting: practices considered to be wholly unsuited for “Hindu”
bodies,  even  if  they  may  be  appropriate  to  “foreign”  (viz.  Islamic)  ones
(Berger 2013:89).  Deepak  Mehta (2000)  shows  how  Muslims  might  in  fact  accede  to
Shastri’s hematic binary categorization, while reversing the moral terms. The ritual
wound that Muslim males bear—which is  both of  and exceeds the body—engenders
pain and blood. Hindus, on the other hand, only get cut in hospital, but there is no
spirituality  in  that  (Mehta 2000:92).  Indeed,  they  (Hindus)  lack  purity  precisely
“because  they  are  afraid  of  shedding  their  blood”  (Mehta 2000:92–3).  Meanwhile,
Golwalkar  also  contrasted  different  religious  communities  according  to  an  axis  of
willingness to shed blood: 
Hindusthan lived a life of unchallenged glory and power for thousands of
years and spread its spiritual and cultural effulgence over vast areas of the
globe  [...]  Never  has  its  flag  waded towards  military  victory  through the
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blood and tears of those races as it happened with Islam and Christianity
when they spread to new countries. Its victory had always been moral and
cultural. (cited in Barua 2017:2). 
23 A  further  chilling  contrast  emerges  amidst  an  episode  of  communal  violence  in
stereotypes  concerning  preferred  means  of  killing:  if  Hindus  burn  their  victims,
Muslims  stab  them  because  “Muslims  are  able  to  ‘withstand  the  sight  of  blood’”
(Ghassem-Fachandi 2006:308).  At  the same time,  however,  there were calls  to,  so to
speak,  sanguinize  Hinduism  as  a  means  of  countering  British  claims  of  Hindu
effeminacy,  and  to  demonstrate  Hindu  virility  in  the  face  of  an  Islamic  threat.  In
particular,  the  Hindu  Mahasabha  launched  a  wholesale  project  to  fortify  Hindu
masculinity  as  a  “basis  for  the  regeneration  of  a  strong  Hindu  nation”  (Ghassem-
Fachandi 2006:24).  In addition to the glorification of  martial  heroes such as Shivaji,
suggestions included the building of akharas and temples to Hanuman in every village,
and the reintroduction of animal sacrifice to reacquaint Hindus with the taste for blood
that  they had supposedly  lost.  At  the 1923 session of  the Mahasabha,  for  instance,
“Since the weak, pacific, and cowardly Hindus had been overrun by the aggressive and
violent  Muslims,  B.S.  Moonje  called  for  the  reinstallation  of  the  Vedic  practice  of
animal  sacrifice  so  that  Hindus  would  become hardened  to  the  sight  of  blood  and
killing”  (Ghassem-Fachandi 2006:24).  Something  of  this  sensibility  was  apparent  in
Nathuram Godse’s rejection of Gandhian ahimsa because it “would ultimately result in
the  emasculation of  the  Hindu Community”  (Godse 1977:7).  Shiv  Sena  activists  also
view Gandhi as the epitome of  “emasculated India” (Heuze 1992:2260).  Shiv Sainiks,
instead, see themselves as “people of blood” (Heuze 1992:2261). Indeed blood, as Heuze
shows, is at the heart of Sainiks’ project for regenerating the “emasculated community-
nation”  (Heuze 1992:2259).  While  Gandhi’s  aversion  to  blood  is  nowhere  near  as
straightforward as suggested in these accounts (see Copeman and Banerjee 2019:46–85),
this is nonetheless Gandhi’s status amongst adherents of Hindutva-based ideologies.
24 Dibyesh Anand’s (2011)  ethnography further reveals  how the prevalent Hindu Right
equation of pacifism with impotence is figured across a range of Hindu Right figures
and tracts, precisely as a problematic of the blood; specifically, Hindu blood, frozen
over, is castigated as being incapable of generating the necessary masculine heat for
defending Hindu interests. Regaining a lost virility is equated with making Hindu blood
boil once more. As one VHP sadhu complained at a rally in Hardwar, “Hinduon ka khoon
thoda thanda ho gaya hai [The blood of Hindus has cooled down]” (Anand 2011:85). A VCD
documenting the exploits of “Ram bhaktas” killed in the cause of construction of a Ram
Mandir in Ayodhya recites the slogan: “jis hindu ka khoon na khole, woh khoon nahin paani
ha [a Hindu whose blood does not boil, has no blood but water]” (Anand 2011:134). Soon
after the Godhra incident in Gujarat in 2002, the BJP youth wing in Delhi chanted: “Jis
Hinduon ka khoon na khola, woh Hindu nahin, woh hijra hain [Those Hindus whose blood
does not boil, are not Hindus, they are eunuchs]” (Anand 2011:146).18 More recently,
stirring up a nationalist  frenzy in the days before his  re-election,  Modi invoked an
attack on the Indian military in Kashmir, insisting that “The blood of the people is
boiling!” (Filkins 2019).19 
25 Similarly preoccupied with asserting their hemo-virility, Shiv Sainiks go further still in
pursuing plural and diverse encounters with blood which fuse together different modes
and  ideologies  of  bloodshed.  Connections  are  generated  between a  world  in  which
(communal) bloodshed is rife, and in which Sainiks are, of course, deeply implicated,
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and their  own founding of  a  blood bank,  alongside  their  willingness  to  donate  the
substance and to oversee its distribution. Indeed, for some in the organization “the
fresh  blood  of  the  Shiv  Sainiks  will  regenerate  the  old  blood  of  the  nation”
(Heuze 1992:2261). Sainiks, says Heuze (1992), are
fascinated  by  blood  as  a  means  of  fostering  a  brotherhood in  battle  and
founding a nation, but they also, and perhaps more significantly maintain a
blood  bank  which  has  no  medical  equivalent  in  the  city.  Rather  than  a
reversion to passion, as regularly denounced by the recognised adversaries
of ‘fundamentalism’, this would represent a new articulation of passion and
reason,  a  dynamic  disposition  oriented  towards  short-term  social  and
political  effectiveness in the framework of a violently transformed world,
which one might see exemplified in the formation of the Shiv Sena. (P. 2261)
Given our own findings concerning widespread fears harbored by Indian men about the
emasculating  effects of  donating  their  blood  (impotence,  infertility,  weakness—see
Copeman 2009a;  Copeman  and  Banerjee 2019),  it  is  even  more  intriguing  to  note
Sainiks’ connecting together of bloodshed, including their own, with virility. Yet we do
not see a contradiction between the blood donation’s potential to emasculate and make
virile. For if men do not donate the substance because they feel they have too little of it
(khuun ki kami), or because they believe it to be irrecoverable (viz. it is like donating a
kidney),  or  because  it  will  render  them infertile  or  impotent, then in  fact  enacted
donation of blood forms a masculine demonstration of substantial abundance; viz. one
has enough of the substance to donate it and still to retain one’s masculinity.20 So while
the act can emasculate—“I can’t donate as I’m getting married next month”—equally it
can demonstrate substantive masculinity if one nonetheless goes ahead and donates.
The Facebook page of a Jalandhar-based blood donors association is indicative of this
aspect  of  the  masculinity  of  blood donation.21 It consists  of  photographs  glorifying
individual  blood  donors  as  they  donate.  Every  donor  depicted  is  male,  and  each
photograph contains the words “Blood Commando” and the number of times they have
donated emblazoned over. In several of the photographs the donor poses to flex his
muscles even as his blood departs from them. A local gym advertises on the page: blood
donors get 15 days free. Here the number of times one has given blood is the gauge of
one’s masculinity, precisely a mark of vigor rather than its exhaustion. We suggest that
Shiv  Sainiks’  willingness  to  donate  despite  the  widespread  belief  in  its  weakening
effects serves as a demonstration of their excessive manliness—that they have enough
masculine substance to spare for, so to speak, re-masculating “the community-nation.”
 
The RSS’s Blood 
26 This  hematic  revivification  of  the  nation  is  a  major  theme  within  Hindutva  blood
donation activities, but it is important to remember that Hindutva organizations are
not the only political outfits to memorialize nationalist sacrifices via blood donation:
Indian soldiers who died in the 1999 India-Pakistan Kargil  conflict  are remembered
annually through blood donation camps staged in their honor by a variety of different
political movements; the same is true for the policemen who were killed defending the
Indian Parliament building (Lok Sabha) when it was attacked by militants in 2002. For
donor recruiter Dr. Ajay Bagga from Hoshiarpur, Punjab state, it is “the memory of the
bullet-ridden, blood-soaked body of his father [a political leader in the Punjab Pradesh
Janata Party, who was assassinated by militants in 1984] which propelled him towards
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the  blood donation movement.”22 The  commemoration  of  bloodshed for  the  nation
through acts  of  blood donation shares at  least  partial  structural  affinity with quite
conventional sacrificial logics: in remembering blood sacrifice through blood donation,
the  deaths  of  the  soldiers  and  policemen  are  regenerative  in  precipitating  blood
donations  that  will  plant  ‘the  seed  of  new  life  and  a  guarantee  of  continuity’
(Parry 2015). Such blood donation camps are both expressive and constitutive of the
soldier’s role more generally—his bloodshed ensures the continuity of the nation. Blood
donation, in these contexts, embodies the extensibility of blood sacrifice for the nation.
Different orders of blood shedding—the soldier’s blood sacrifice and the citizen’s blood
donation—are analogically transferable. 
27 We  suggest  that  the  soldierly  comparison  is  germane  to  certain  tensions  within
Hindutva. Christophe Jaffrelot (2007:300) notes how in 1965 and 1971, when India was
at war with China and East Pakistan respectively, “RSS volunteers offered their services
to maintain law and order in Delhi and to donate blood.” Similarly, the RSS is reported
to have collected more than 10,000 liters of blood to aid the Indian troops during the
1999 Kargil war. “More blood than they bloody knew what to do with,” laughed one
swayamsevak  (Alter 2000:147).  In  other  words,  the  RSS  is  quick  to  organize  blood
donation camps at times when the nation is at war, with the express intent that the
donated blood be used by the Indian armed forces as necessary. We have discussed
elsewhere (Copeman 2008) an RSS volunteer from a Jain background who was proud of
his role in helping the RSS collect blood during the Kargil war. Organizing blood for the
army  helped  him  mediate  between  the  different  imperatives  of  ahimsa and  RSS
militarism. Drawing on James Laidlaw’s (1995) suggestion that Jain attitudes to non-
violence are characterized by an “ethic of quarantine,” we argued that what mattered
to this  worker was not preventing violence from happening (for  violence is  simply
inevitable)  but  avoiding  being  violence’s  proximate  cause.  Similarly,  with  blood
donation, even as it is an act of literal bodily connection, by virtue of its anonymity it is
also one of disconnection. Anonymity and distance allow donors to avoid becoming the
proximate cause of violence, while at the same time allowing them to participate in the
symbolic flows of bleeding for the nation. It offers donors a more remote and supple
role, allowing those who profess non-violence to nonetheless distally engage in arenas
of violence. 
28 The argument précised above was made in reference to a single Jain swayamsevak, but it
helps  to  differentiate  a  range  of  Hindutva  positions  vis-à-vis  blood  donation  and
bloodshed. By no means are all Hindutva organizations alike (see e.g. Anderson 2015).
Different  attitudes  to  blood  and  its  shedding  mark boundaries  between  the  highly
differentiated sets of groups and alliances that cohere under the banner of Hindutva.
For example, under the headline “this page exposes the evil forces that are against the
Hindu people,” the website of the VHP youth group the Bajrang Dal contained a hit list
animated by garishly red, dripping blood.23 This is not the kind of thing one would find
in  RSS  literature,  though  one  will  certainly  find  references  to  its  blood  donation
activities and to the symbolism of blood sacrifice for the nation: many RSS men point to
the  communal  violence  of  Partition  “as  a  kind  of  patriotic  baptism, an  initiation
through blood and sacrifice to the nationalist cause, for the individuals involved as well
as for the corporate RSS body” (Hansen 1999:95), and we discuss below RSS texts that
refer to “feel[ing] a wave of sacrifice in one’s mind” and the desire to “touch the blood-
red soil” of places of Hindu martyrdom. Since its banning and stigmatization after the
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assassination  of  M.K.  Gandhi,  the  RSS  has  sought  to  project  a  “respectable”  image
(Hansen 1999:96),  with a  focus  on the cultivation of  Hindu discipline  and character
building, leaving the work of bloodshed and mass action to other affiliated and non-
affiliated organizations. But if acts or encouragements of bloodshed are dangerous for
the RSS—the dripping red hit list for example—the symbolism of blood sacrifice for the
nation is perfectly permissible. We can see this bifurcation along hematic lines in the
Ram Janmabhumi movement. As was widely reported, Bajrang Dal activists mobilized
an array of  strikingly bloody sacrificial  practices during the procession:  not merely
lofty rhetoric concerning sacrifice for the nation or representations of excorporation,
but actual excorporations—for instance, offering L.K. Advani cups of their own blood,
and tilaks of the same substance during the politician’s notorious rath yatra. Yet, such
sacrifices are not consonant with Advani’s Brahmanical RSS background, nor with the
RSS’s cultivation of an aura of responsibility, sobriety and discipline. As a result, the
young activists  were  sent  word to  desist  (Davis 1996:30).  No doubt  Advani’s  refusal
came from a concern to maintain his image as a respectable upper-class urban Hindu
and to avoid a too-obvious culpability for the violence to come. Yet it is also again clear
that different attitudes towards blood and its sacrifice marked a division between the
“hard” and “soft” lines of Hindutva. A recent RSS publication represents well the public
impression it seeks to convey: “the image that blind critics of Sangh create—that of
lumpen elements,  riotous  mobs  and bloodthirsty  fanatics—is  far  removed from the
reality of enlightened, highly trained, dedicated, selfless activists who sacrifice their
most loved interests to work for the society, their motherland” (Sharda 2018). 
29 Consider also, the different attitudes towards blood maintained by the RSS and the Shiv
Sena. Unlike Shiv Sainiks who contrast themselves as “people of blood” to Gandhi as a
“man  of  excrement,”  the  RSS  has  tried  to  appropriate  Gandhi,  ahimsa  and  all
(Heuze 1992:2261).  Where  the  Shiv  Sena  explicitly  rejects  Brahmanical  values,
Golwalkar—who was just one of the RSS’s elite, high-caste Brahmin leaders—claimed
that a key font of Hindu virtue was located precisely in its aversion to bloodshed. An
RSS tract states that while Marx, Hitler and Mao Zedong were able to change societies,
in doing so they “left millions dead” (Kumar 2017:37). Men of the “true Hindu vision,”
however— “whether Buddha, Adi Sankara or Dr Hedgewar”—were “able to change the
society without blood shed” (Kumar 2017:37). Indeed, while RSS volunteers hail from
many different backgrounds, the RSS, unlike other Hindu Right outfits such as the Shiv
Sena,  has  been  traditionally  Brahmin-dominated,  with  its  origins  among  the
Maharashtrian  Brahmin  community  (Sarkar 1996:172).  As  Hugh  Urban (2018)  and
Anthony Good (2016)  have  noted,  Hindu nationalists  tend to  be  at  the  forefront  of
campaigns to ban blood sacrifice in the form of animal killings. For all that, the RSS
joins the Shiv Sena in its enthusiastic and longstanding promotion of blood donation
activities. 
30 Thus, it is apparent that the analogical transferability of the soldier’s blood sacrifice
and the citizen’s blood donation helps mediate ahimsa-related Brahmanical elements of
Hindutva and its otherwise bloody imperatives, particularly in the case of some RSS
volunteers. For the RSS, blood donation mediates between the bloodless symbolism of
sacrifice and actual practices of bloody sacrifice. If Moonje, as we saw, called for the
reintroduction of blood sacrifice as all the better for Hindus to reacquaint themselves
with the taste for blood, in Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi’s (2012) analysis, disavowed Hindu
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logics  of  blood sacrifice  in fact  resurface in episodes of  communal  violence.  In our
argument, these logics rematerialize in the less destructive form of blood donations. 
31 Returning  once  more  to  the  RSS’s  Dr.  Hedgewar  Blood  Bank,  we  witness  a  similar
entanglement  of  violent/non-violent  ideological  underpinnings.  We  met  three  RSS
volunteers in Delhi who either had participated in its foundation or whose task it was
to represent the blood bank and publicize its activities in the capital and beyond. One
of them explained to us that, in addition to Hedgewar himself, it is the mythical sage
Dadhichi  who serves as  a  major sacrificial  inspiration for  the blood bank.24 Indeed,
Golwalkar,  as  we noted earlier,  directly  equated Hedgewar’s  transfusion of  his  life-
blood to society with Dadhichi’s prior bodily sacrifice. Dadhichi, as recounted in the
Brahmana Purana and in the hymns of the Rig Veda, was renowned for his penances and
tapas (austerities). As a great tapasvi (ascetic), he had transformed his body into that
which was pavitra (pure), tejisvi (glorious) and, critically, immensely strong. To counter
the  dangerous  threat  of  a  demon  king,  he  allowed  his  bones  to  be  used  to  craft
weapons. Thus, having made a supreme bodily sacrifice, he is frequently invoked in
Hindu contexts as the “first body donor” and as a fitting exemplar for use in promoting
donation of biological materials. For Hindutva purposes, he is also a fittingly martial
figure: his bodily donation, after all, was for the construction of weapons. Dadhichi, we
were told by one of the volunteers
believed  in  non-violence.  But  when  the  country  is  in  danger,  violence
becomes legitimate…He spent his whole life meditating on peace, so to give
his bones for war was a supreme sacrifice. We compare blood donation to
this. I would be happy that my blood is benefiting others, even in another
continent… humanity  is  one.  But  it  is  not  always  that  a  Hindu gives  for
anyone. When abnormal conditions like war are present, or an ideological
fight or crisis like the Iraq crisis and there is demand for blood from both
sides, then one has to think – is it going to be used for good or bad purposes.
A follower of Dadhichi gives blood for whoever we think protects humanity.
I, for example, could never donate blood for the Pakistan army.25
We see then how the martial nature of Dadhichi’s sacrifice seeps into understandings of
Hindu nationalist blood donations. In the swayamsevak’s retelling, part of what made
Dadhichi’s sacrifice supreme was his otherwise central concern with non-violence. It
was meditating on that subject that had, paradoxically, made his bones so strong and
ideal  for  use  as  weaponry.  Such  ambivalences  and  intertwining  sum  up  RSS  blood
donation  activities  well.  The  swayamsevak’s  statement  also  reminds  us  of  the  RSS’s
particular interest in donating blood during wars and for soldiers. Dadhichi allowed his
body  to  be  used  as  a  weapon in  a  “just  war,”’  what  Kautilya’s  Arthashastra calls  a
dharma-yuddha  (Gittinger 2011:25).  The  anonymity  of  voluntary  blood  donation  is
conventionally associated with a movement beyond categories: the blood will be used
for anyone; boundary-marking norms are taken to be disrupted through such flows. The
swayamsevak,  however,  references  both  this  transcendental  promissory  impulse
(“humanity is one”) and its breakdown (“I…could never donate blood for the Pakistan
army”). In the denouement, his fascination lies in a different kind of promise, one that
is sacrificial and Hindu national: “Dadhichi is the only example where a man donates
his bones for weapons, when for the whole of his life he had been meditating on non-
violence. But in defeating the demons, his bones gave life to the nation.” The RSS’s
preoccupation  with  voluntary  blood  donation  especially  during  war no  doubt
contributes  to  its  signaling  of  nationalist  virtue,  as  discussed  above,  but  it  also
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instantiates  a  second  mediation:  if  its  anonymity is  in  alignment  with  its  claim  to
espouse  a  message  of  universal  humanity  (Bhatt 2001:176),  its  temporality (the
particular political moment in which it is given) facilitates its fantasy of “defeating the
demons” through a sacrifice that will give life to the nation.
 
Temporal Continuums
Histories in/of Blood
32 Urban (2018:158) correctly argues that we should consider blood sacrifice as not only a
deep structural  logic  of  enduring significance across the subcontinent—though it  is
that, too—but also an “instrument of struggle”: “a discursive weapon wielded amid a
complex field of competing narratives and counternarratives.” We have suggested that
such competing imperatives and intuitions are encapsulated within the act of blood
donation in Hindutva contexts. The Hindutva blood donation is a marker of difference
as well as an exhortation towards assimilation. It reveals a virile desire for bloodshed
even as it draws upon a symbolism of restraint and non-violence. And further, as we
describe  below,  it  is  “temporally  indiscrete.”  Hindutva  blood  donations  point
backwards  towards  prior  shedding,  while  at  the  same  time  pointing  forward,
threatening future spillage. 
33 To elaborate, histories of the anti-colonial struggle generally have been written along
three axes: the first foregrounds the role of Indian elites as collaborators in colonial
rule,  the second lauds the anti-colonial  ideologies of Gandhi and the secular Indian
National Congress, and the third (in response to the first two), emphasizes subaltern
consciousness  and  practices  that  are  not  easily  assimilable  into  the  pan-Indian
categories  of  nationalism,  secularism  or  religion  (Chakrabarty 2000).  The  pre-
Independence founders and leaders of Hindutva do not have a privileged position in
any of these narratives; they are either considered irrelevant, or as more committed to
securing Hindu interests than opposing colonial rule. Thus, Hindutva nationalists find
it difficult to pinpoint a lineage for their own brand of nationalist politics in all three
dominant accounts of India’s late colonial and postcolonial history (Udaykumar 2005).
Blood donation drives  by  Hindu nationalist  organizations  are  designed precisely  to
ameliorate this anxiety and to write Hindutva, in and through blood, back into Indian
history.
34 Such a strategy relies on an imagined ability of blood to authorize and verify national
commitments.  As  with  the  Shiv  Sena  and RSS  blood  camps,  this  form of  Hindutva
politics  demands  actual hematic  excorporations  to  be  effective.  Through
spectacularized acts of giving, Indian politicians and activists underscore an association
between themselves  and the  national  good through the  witnessed offering of  their
blood. Such offerings are “material reports” of their historical importance and long-
standing embodied commitments to the nation.26 In their work on the politics of gift
giving,  Nikolai  Ssorin-Chaikov  and  Olga  Sosnina (2004)  downplay  the  typical
anthropological  problematic  of  reciprocity  in  gift  settings,  emphasizing instead the
ability of gifts to demonstrate facts: “matters of fact” are demonstrated through the
giving of “facts of matter.” While Indian political activists certainly offer blood with the
hope of reciprocity in the form of their own political advancement, Ssorin-Chaikov and
Sosnina’s  argument  concerning  the  irreducibility  of  giving  to  reciprocity  helps
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illuminate a second dynamic at play: of blood materially and substantially verifying the
truth of Hindutva political commitment. Take for example how, in his book on the RSS,
the organization’s former Vice-President H.V. Seshadri (1998) lists the blood banks that
his  organization manages,  declaring that  “invoking of  patriotic  sentiments  and not
material  incentives  is  at  the  back of  our  success”  (P. 210).  The “selfless  service”  of
Hindu nationalist activists is emphasized: “In Mangalore, an emergency request from
the  district  surgeon  came  to  the  Swayamsevaks  [RSS’  “national  volunteers”]  held
behind bars during the 1975-1977 Emergency. In the course of a few hours, blood from
sixty  Swayamsevaks  was  provided  to  the  needy  in  the  district  hospital.”  During
“national calamities” such as train accidents and earthquakes, Swayamsevaks can be
relied upon to rise to the occasion and donate blood (Seshadri 1998:271). Seshadri lists
numbers of activists who donated, total bags collected, and so on. Enumeration here
serves as demonstration—demonstration of a desired association. 
35 Blood donation, then, helps produce a positive association between the RSS and the
nation, with the former demonstrated to be indispensable to the latter. Scholars such
as  Gerard  Heuze (1992),  Thomas  Hansen (1999)  and  Christophe  Jaffrelot (1996)  have
pointed  to  activists’  unease  with  external  perceptions  of  the  Sangh  Parivar’s
contributions to the nation. We see something of this in Seshadri’s (1998) concern with
the  portrayal  of  the  RSS  in  the  news  media:  when  the  RSS  helps  in  national
emergencies,  “they  never  ask  for  anything  in  return—not  even  a  picture  in  the
Weekly” (P. 257).27 In another article we find that RSS blood donations after a terrible
rail accident in the Punjab “won the praise of all. And yet, except a small English daily
in Delhi, no other major newspaper published what the selfless volunteers of RSS have
done.”28 In such gestures, RSS publications use blood imagery to complain about the
erasure of the RSS from Indian history, while in the same gesture they write themselves
into  the  nation’s  momentous  events.  As  another  example, RSS  literature  has
complained of a lack of recognition of how, in 1947, the organization was instrumental
in restoring Jammu and Kashmir to India. Many swayamsevaks are said to have been
killed: “One feels a wave of sacrifice in one’s mind while wishing to touch the blood-red
soil of Palandhari where the soldiers and the RSS workers shed their blood. Repeated
salutes  to  such  brave  sacrifices.”29 Hindu  nationalist  blood  donations  thus  enact
material reports of patriotic commitment and selfless service. Such service does indeed
gain  them  recognition.  The  mainstream  political  commentator Varsha  Bhosle,  for
example, declares that he refuses to criticize the RSS because they “have been and are
busy setting up blood banks, schools and hospitals in rural areas, aiding the cyclone-
affected, etc.”30 
36 We  can  expand  our  understanding  of  Hindutva’s  material-hematic  historiography
through our ethnographic fieldwork at an exhibition of portraits in blood in honor of
anti-colonial icon Subhas Chandra Bose.31 There exist several accounts of Hindutva’s
appropriations of historical figures, including the socialist atheist Bhagat Singh, Rani
Gaidinliu  (Longkumer 2010),  Ambedkar  (Guru 1991)  and  other  Dalit  heroes
(Narayan 2009),  amongst  others.  Bose is  another figure from the conventional  anti-
colonial nationalist pantheon now appropriated as a Hindu nationalist icon.
37 “Tum mujhe khun do, main tumhen azadi doonga”— “Give me your blood, and I will give
you freedom.” These words, spoken by Bose at a political rally in Burma in 1944, are
some of the most quoted in relation to the Indian anti-colonial struggle. At the time of
their utterance, their purpose was to stimulate a willingness on the part of the Indian
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masses to engage in armed struggle in order to end colonial rule. Our aim is not to
rehearse this familiar narrative of Bose’s invocation of blood as anti-colonial metaphor.
Rather, our interest is in what this invocation precipitates in a contemporary political
world. For Hindutva ideologues, valorizing Bose’s insurgency as armed, masculine and
violent allows for a counter-narrative to an anti-colonial struggle dominated by Gandhi
—a figure with which the Hindu Right has had a fraught relationship. As resurrected by
Hindutva history, Bose is counterpoised to the effeminacy and weakness of Gandhian
nonviolence and exhibited as a more proper exemplar for India in the present. In what
follows, we describe why Bose’s exhortation toward a nationalism coagulated by blood-
sacrifice makes him particularly appealing to contemporary Hindutva ideologues. Our
focus  is  on  an  example  of  blood  portraiture  that  was  directly  inspired  by  Bose’s
utterance—an exhibition  of  blood portraits  staged in  Delhi’s  Red  Fort  in  2009.  The
subjects of the portraits, including Bose among them, were “freedom fighter” martyrs
—sacrificial heroes of the Independence struggle. The following details concerning the
exhibition derive from our visits to it, where we spoke at length with its organizer and
visitors, but also from newspaper accounts and the visitors’ book, with its thousands of
entries, to which we were given access. 
38 The exhibition of  blood-portraitures  ran from October  2009 until  the spring of  the
following  year,  drawing  visitors  in  the  hundreds  of  thousands  (3-4,000  per  day
according to official figures). The sign outside the tin-roofed exhibition hall, framed by
an  elongated  Indian  tricolor,  stated  in  Hindi  and  in  English:  “Exhibition  of  Blood
Paintings of Young Martyrs.” Most visitors were Indian; a good proportion of them had
arrived on coach trips from the provinces, visiting the Red Fort as part of a nationalist
itinerary  that  included  other  notable  sights  in  the  capital.  It  was  Bose’s  famous
utterance from which the organizer of the exhibition, Ravi Chander Gupta, took his
original inspiration. Indeed, the very first portrait he gave his blood for—painted by his
friend and colleague the artist Gurdarshan Singh Binkal—was of and for Bose, painted
for Bose’s birth centenary in 1997. Significantly, the painting was made in the physical
presence of  Delhi  schoolchildren.  For  Gupta,  a  retired schoolteacher,  the children’s
dispiriting ignorance of former patriotic sacrifices was one of the motivating factors
behind the  portraits:  “The  biographies  of  martyrs  should  be  included  in  course
curriculum. Paintings, posters and calendars of freedom fighters should be promoted
so that more and more people know them and read about them.” As one news report
put it:  “Gupta feels that very few people are aware about our freedom fighters and
especially the youth.”32 Another reported that Gupta’s organization hoped to take the
150-portrait  “shaheed”  exhibition  across  the  country:  “those  born  in  the  post-
Independence era cannot feel the struggle of freedom fighters.”33 A selection of the
eighteen books Gupta has written on the martyrs, several of which were published by
the Indian government, were on display at the entrance to the exhibition alongside the
visitors’ book. In the mid-2000s he formed an organization, the Shaheed Smriti Chetna
Samiti (Society to Awaken Remembrance of the Martyrs; henceforth “the samiti”) to
help look after the paintings, and to ensure they would be cared for after his passing.
He lives alone; as he put it to us: “the martyrs are my family.”
39 Speaking of the very first portrait for which he provided blood, that of Subhas Chandra
Bose, Gupta told us: “I wanted to use my dearest thing (sab se priya vastu) – to offer it to
Neta Ji. The dearest particle of my life—this is blood only. I can do this for him.” Too
young at the time of Bose’s call, decades later Gupta is finally able to participate in a
glorious cause. This is, then, a sacrificial portraiture: for the martyrs and for the nation.
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Gupta recalled to us his days as a schoolteacher in a government school in east Delhi: “I
felt the children knew nothing. They thought we achieved freedom without lifting a
finger.  They  sang  popular  songs  about  Gandhi  and  ahimsa.  They  thought  we  got
freedom without picking up a weapon! And so I said, well, I need to tell the children it’s
not  true.”  This  is,  then,  an  explicitly  anti-Gandhian  project  of  re-education  and
historical revision. Nationalist historiography—at least in terms of its manifestation in
school curricula—hinges on what Gupta sees as a Gandhian perversion, to be corrected,
in  part,  by  the  exhibitions  he  stages.  Memorials  such  as  the  Red  Fort  have  been
powerful  sites  of  confrontation  between  Hindutva  nationalists,  secular  elites  and
subaltern subjects (Kavuri-Bauer 2011). Gupta’s organization aims to intervene in the
negotiation process of collective memory in order to revivify and stabilize a particular
body of remembrances.  Specifically,  an ongoing complaint of Hindutva activists has
been that “secular” Indian historians have offered a false narrative of Indian history
that appeases minority groups such as Muslims, while victimizing the Hindu majority
that  had  been  under  Muslim  domination  in  the  pre-colonial  period.  Hindutva
historiography  thus  strives  to  resuscitate  an  ancient,  masculine  and  proud  Hindu
identity, one that does not fit well with Gandhian calls to nonviolence. 
40 Leafing through the visitors’ book with Gupta—a favorite occupation of his during the
long days of the exhibition, at which he was always present—we asked him which, of
the thousands of comments, he found most gratifying. He guided us unhesitatingly to
the words of an 8-year-old schoolboy from Delhi: “These paintings are from the heart,
when the time comes to sacrifice my blood for the protection of my country I  will
sacrifice my whole life.” As Gupta put it to us: “This exhibition is to inspire the people
to make sacrifices. Sacrifices are not all over now. You can still do it; you should still do
it. The sacrifices are not only in the past; even in the future there is a time for sacrifice
for the country.” In other words, Gupta is calling for the re-temporalization of sacrifice.
The paintings are thus a form of enactive remembering—depictions of blood sacrifice
that  perform  the  bleeding  they  represent  and  seek  to  inspire,  a  retort  to  “weak”
Gandhian nationalism. And the retort appears to “work,” in part, through their being
imitative  of  the  bleeding  they  seek  to  inspire.  Gupta’s  art  is  mimetic  in  so  far  as
“originary” blood sacrificers are paid homage to by bleeding in turn, but mimetic also
in terms of the willingness to sacrifice one’s blood that it is supposed to incite in the
viewer. 
41 Indeed, despite Gupta’s often-professed broad and inclusive “secular” nationalism, his
use of blood is caught within the symbolic universe of right-wing political mediations
of blood as a biomoral substance. The transactional enframement of the blood painting,
and its metonymic threat as a model very much for as well as of sacrificial bleeding are
also features of  a  wider Hindutva politics.  Such shared features should cause us  to
reconsider  whether  the  samiti is  in  fact  as  broadly  secular  and  inclusive  as  it  is
presented by its founders. While conducting fieldwork, we were informed by Gupta that
he  has  recently  received  the  promise  of  a  permanent  home  for  his  portraits  in
Vrindavan at the ashram of female Hindu ascetic Sadhvi Rithambara. The location she
has offered would place the portraits firmly under a Hindutva sign. Sadhvi Rithambara
is a Vishwa Hindu Parishad activist of particular notoriety, well known for her anti-
Muslim rhetoric and legally charged and widely regarded to have been instrumental in
fueling the anti-Muslim tensions that resulted in the destruction of the Babri Masjid
(Bhatt 2001:186;  Hansen 1999:179–80).  Indeed,  her  care  of  blood  portraits
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commemorating  bloodshed  would  be  entirely  appropriate:  during  the  Ayodhya
agitations she is reported to have recited the following Hindi poem: 
May our race not be blamed
And may our mothers not say
That when we were needed, we weren’t ready
If there must be a bloodbath
Then let's get it over with
Because of our fear of a bloodbath before
Our country was divided [at partition]
Since their arrival until today
They have killed so many Hindus
We tried to appease them
But there was bloodshed after all
Instead of having it simmer slowly
It's better to have it burst with a big flame
If they don't understand our words
Then we'll make them understand with kicks
If there must be a bloodbath, then let it happen. 
(cited in Manuel 1996:132)
In 2010, Gupta took the Sadhvi up on her offer, and the National Martyrs Museum was
opened  within  her  sprawling  NGO  complex  in  Vrindavan.  The  inauguration  of  the
samiti’s  exhibition  was  attended  by  the  uppermost  echelons  of  Hindu  nationalist
politicians, including current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, then BJP president Nitin
Gadkari, Vishwa Hindu Parishad president Ashok Singhal, RSS leader Mohan Bhagwat,
and BJP General Secretary Vijay Goel.34 
42 Further,  Sadhvi  Rithambara’s  recontextualization of  the paintings  is  explicitly  anti-
Muslim: “It  is  a rare work; the atrocities of past rulers have been exposed through
portraits  prepared  in  blood  and  it  is  praiseworthy;  it  is  a  symbol  of  committed
patriotism.”35 The  openness  of  the  term  “past  rulers”  is  a  well-known  Hindutva
category that seeks to encompass not only colonial rule, but also a putatively violent
pre-colonial Muslim rule. Thus, despite Gupta’s claims of a non-discriminatory politics,
his close complicity with Hindutva figures poses questions about the samiti’s claims to a
secular  universality.  Explicitly,  both  Hindutva  activists  and  Gupta’s  samiti share  a
commitment to a revisionist historiography that aims to foreground armed insurgents
over  nonviolent  Gandhian  satyagrahis.  This  revisionist  impulse  ties  nonviolence
together with weakness, effeminacy and passivity, foregrounding the masculine ethos
of the insurgents, and finding in such insurgents a nascent commitment to a Hindu
nation to come. Thus revised, Hindutva historiography calls upon past bloodshed to
legitimize bloodshed in the present and threaten its possibility in the future. Through
portraitures and donations,  blood circulates in the Hindutva imaginary to clear the
ground for a Hindu nation and community to come: one united by blood. 
 
Past, Present and Future Bleeding
43 We return now to the Shiv Sena. We explain elsewhere (Copeman and Banerjee 2019:93)
how the Shiv Sena’s hematic engagements do not always go according to plan: we focus
in particular, in that other work, on a massive blood donation camp organized by the
Shiv  Sena  on Maharashtra  Day  in  2010,  to  which  critics  responded by  stating  that
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rather than taking people’s blood, the party should be providing them with substances
of  the  civic  such  as  water  and  electricity.  Allegations  were  also  made  of  forcible
extractions taking place at the event. We focus here on a different aspect of the camp:
its association with prior blood sacrifices. Headlined “Lata Mangeshkar to sing for Shiv
Sena on Maharashtra  Day,”  a  news report  publicized the imminent  blood donation
camp, explaining that the musical event referred to in the headline would be preceded
by a
Mahayagna of blood donation to commemorate the sacrifices made by the
leading  lights  of  the  SMM  [Samyukta  Maharashtra  Movement36]  and  the
martyrs  who  fought  successfully  for  carving  out  a  separate  state  of
Maharashtra with Mumbai as the capital from the erstwhile Bombay state. It
is because of their sacrifice that we secured Mumbai and Maharashtra for the
Marathis. Even now we are prepared to shed our blood for Mumbai, Uddhav
[Thackeray, Shiv Sena leader] asserted. He appealed to all people to come out
in large numbers and take part in the blood donation ‘Mahayagna’ on April
25  at  Goregaon  suburb  in  northwest  Mumbai.  He  said  that  though  the
present  generation  was  aware  of  the  SSM,  the  future  generations  would
remain ignorant if efforts were not made to enlighten them.37 
As we have suggested,  commemorating heroes through blood donations is  a  widely
shared  political  idiom:  for  example,  Congress  activists  donate  blood  on  the death
anniversary of the assassination of Indira Gandhi, quoting an instance of bloodshed of a
different order. But consider the use of the term mahayagna (ritual sacrifice) by Uddhav
Thackeray, which literalizes the sacrificial  connection between different episodes of
extraction.  Like  Moonje,  cited  earlier,  the  Shiv  Sena  explicitly  makes  a  connection
between  blood  sacrifice  and  the  need  to  remasculate  the  nation;  the  emasculated
community-nation will be rejuvenated through bodily sacrifices. The martyr, in this
way  of  thinking,  “fuses  with  his  blood  the  symbolic  unity  of  the  collectivity”
(Heuze 1992:2259).  It  is  apparent  that  a  peculiar  dynamism  marks  how  Hindutva
movements connect their martyrologies with blood donation. Notice here an echo of
Savarkar’s (1989)  original  formulation:  “Let  this  ancient  and noble  stream of  Hindu
blood flow from vein to vein till at last the Hindu people get fused and welded into an
indivisible whole,  till  our race gets consolidated and strong sharp as steel” (P. 139).
Notice also an echo of the logic of Golwalkar’s (2000) question: “Is not every speck of
our land protected and purified by the sacred blood of countless heroes and martyrs?”
Animating the spirit of this question, blood donation events by present-day Hindutva
activists generate a sense of post hoc participation in prior sacrifices (P. 89).
44 Consider also the following memorial blood donation event recounted to us by a Delhi-
based RSS worker. While stationed in Punjab in the 1990s he was involved in organizing
an RSS blood donation camp on 23 March, the day of Bhagat Singh’s martyrdom (he was
executed by the British on that day in 1931): ‘That particular day is vivid in my eyes. His
[Bhagat Singh’s] sister was still alive then. We organized a blood donation camp, and
she was the chief guest. When we made a list of the volunteers to donate blood, the
blood bank people raised their hands saying, “It’s impossible we can’t take this much.
We don’t have any arrangements to do so much blood…” We said, “Shaheedo ko yaad
karen apna khun den [We remember the martyrs by donating our own blood].” In the
presence of a blood relative of one of the most renowned freedom fighters to have shed
their blood in the cause of the nation, RSS members donated their blood. But that was
not all. The swayamsevaks received, post-donation, a tilak of dust that had been brought
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in a kalash from Bhagat Singh’s cremation grounds. And so, in a dense tangle of the
symbolic and the material, they received back bodily substance (their bodies as ash and
blood, burned and spilled into the soil) from the very shaheed they had donated to.
Initiating the circle of substantial exchanges of blood and soil, Bhagat Singh himself is
reported to have gone to the site of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in 1919, and to have
“kissed the earth sanctified by the martyrs’ blood and brought back home a little of the
soaked soil.”38 No matter the militant socialism and atheism of Bhagat Singh: the Hindu
Right reaches out to absorb such seemingly unsympathetic figures into its canon of
Hindu nationalist virtue. 
45 Consider also how the VHP and its youth wing, the Bajrang Dal, conduct massive annual
blood  donation  camps  on  November  2  to  mark  “Sacrifice  Day”—the  day  the  first
incident of firing on karsevaks took place in Ayodhya.39 Dibyesh Anand (2011:130) gives
an account of Hindutva memory work in respect of the Ram Janmabhumi movement. A
VCD he purchased from a stall at the disputed site in Ayodhya celebrates the martyrs of
the movement, with the slogan: “Bhakto ka seene pe goliyan khaana, mandir ke khatir khoon
bahaana,  dekho  Ram  ke  sache  bhakton,  6  Dissambar  bhool  na  jaana [The  devotees  who
braved bullets in their chest, who sacrificed blood for the cause of the temple; True
followers of Rama remember, never forget 6 December].” A Bajrang Dal leader reports
on the expansion of his organization’s hematic memorialization activities: “While we
used to have about 5,000 volunteers in our camps, this year, we are targeting about 1
lakh  volunteers  who  would  donate  blood.”40 Indeed,  memorialization  of  Hindutva
activists who fell in Ayodhya in 1992 forms a major focus of Hindutva blood donation
activity across the country.41
46 At one of these camps at the Jamshedpur blood bank in Bistupur on the occasion of
Hutatma Diwas, in which a total of 151 units of blood was reportedly collected, the VHP
Mahanagar President, Arun Singh stated that “the VHP and Bajrang Dal is committed
for  construction  of  Ram  Mandir.”42 On  one  level  the  statement  appears  merely
congruent with—an example of—our earlier argument about blood extractions making
commitments visible. Here, Hindutva activists’ blood donations show, and underscore,
their  commitment to the building of  a  temple.  But while  the event evidently looks
backward to the blood sacrifices of  karsevaks,  it  also explicitly looks forward to the
building of the temple. In this light the camp seems also to take the form of a threat,
with  activists’  blood  donations  to  be  understood  as  synechdochal  instances  of  the
future bloodshed they presage. Notably, the Shiv Sena mouthpiece, Samna, was full of
talk of blood sacrifice even prior to the violence here recalled, seeming to will it into
being, and certainly helping to precipitate it. An editorial published the day before the
destruction of the Babri Masjid proclaimed that “the Sariyu River had once turned red
with the blood of the Ram Bhakts (disciples of the God Ram) and it is going to happen
again with the blood of the Kar Sevaks (religious work as worship).  Prepare for this
martyrdom  for  the  sake  of  the  future  of  the  country”  (cited  in  Mehta 2009:7).  We
witness a hematic-mimetic continuum: prior bloodsheds, to be recalled and re-enacted
(“it is going to happen again”) in the fight to demolish the mosque, which duly enacted,
is recalled and re-enacted once more in the form of the blood donation memorial event,
which in turn expresses a metonymic commitment and intention to shed more of the
substance for the cause in the future. If we also consider the allegation made by the
Hindu Janajagruti Samiti that “Hindu blood” was used to color the stones of the mosque
in its construction, the extent to which the mimetic shedding of blood governs the
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historical imagination of the Hindu right comes even more fully into view.43 Events
such as these simultaneously look backwards, appropriating anticolonial heroes, and
forward, in intimating future extractions: the blood donation unbound.
 
Consanguineal Plasma
47 The usefulness of thinking of blood’s metaphorical and material potency again becomes
especially  clear  if  we  consider  the  recent  attempts  by  the  Indian  government  to
establish a religious basis to citizenship claims from those that live outside the nation-
state. The Citizenship Amendment Act has become the most recent materialization of
an imagined and enforced historical consanguinity. Take for example Prime Minister
Narendra  Modi’s  reassurance  at  a  rally  in  Assam  to  the  region’s  Bengali  speaking
Hindus  that  their  fears  of  being  excluded  as  immigrants  by  new  citizenship
requirements were unfounded, because he believed that the color of their shared blood
relations  with  the  nation’s  Hindus  was  more  important  than  the  color  of  their
passports  (Apoorvanand 2019).  If  blood  serves  as  the  grounds  of  citizenship,  messy
complexities of determining the citizenship of inhabitants of uncertain frontiers can be
substituted with a simple conceptual blood test. This blood test, of course, carries on
the tradition of Hindutva mobilizations of the substance. The test is not biological or
DNA-based but asks about the allegiance of the citizen to the idea of an original Hindu
consanguinity.  That is,  the CAA is  a punitive legal  manifestation of  a long-standing
claim  we  have  described  in  this  paper—that  ancient  inhabitants  of  India  shared  a
common blood-tie, only recently betrayed and broken by the recent conversion of some
to Islam. Because of this shared consanguinity, Muslims could return to the fold, if only
they were to give up their allegiance to Mecca.  The implications of  this Hindutva’s
knotting  together  of  geography  and  blood  (based  on  an  implicit  assumption  that
Muslim blood had now been recently contaminated by conversion) reveals itself in the
logic  of  the  CAA.  Because  of  their  blood-betrayal,  they  cannot  legitimately  claim
citizenship  by  default.  And  by  association,  nor  should  their  supporters:  anti-CAA
protestors  were  all  “anti-national”  because  they  question  Hindutva’s  hematological
geography. 
48 Take for instance a campaign song released by the BJP in February 2020, before the
Delhi Assembly elections.44 The song (in Hindi) is a rousing defense of the idea of an
“Akhand Bharat.”45
They left cracks, in this undivided India.
The same thing, we will never accept again.
Predictably,  from what  we have argued in  this  paper,  the  call  for  uniting a  blood-
community always comes with a  threat  of  blood spillage against  those who do not
belong: 
This blood of Shiva, That flows in your veins,
Is boiling, Telling everyone now.
Notice the uncanny echo of the theme of the boiling of Hindu blood, an echo that is so
insistent  that  it  may  be  considered  a  vital  trope  of  Hindutva  rhetoric.  We  have
described this trope’s appearance in the rally of a VHP sadhu in Hardwar, during the
destruction of the Babri Masjid and the events leading up to Godhra and, most recently,
in Modi’s speech leading up to his retaliatory attacks on Pakistan. The idea is that this
long-dormant blood provoked finally into heat carries with it the premonitory threat of
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bloodshed, a threat carried out time and again in India’s postcolonial history, and most
recently against Muslims in Delhi as retaliation against anti-CAA protests.
49 The same campaign song also reveals  the attempt by Hindutva adherents  to  insert
themselves into an anti-colonial history from which they find themselves excluded: 
You are Subhash [Chandra Bose], you are Bhagat [Singh],
You are Azad [freedom fighter Chandrashekhar Azad],
You are Gandhi’s non-violence,
And [Maharana] Pratap’s sword.
You are Bhim’s [Bhimrao Ambedkar’s] law,
Sardar’s determination.
Here, these lyrics appropriate not only Bose (as we have described in detail earlier) but
also, dizzyingly, draw in Bhagat Singh, Chandrashekar Azad, Maharana Pratap’s sword
and Dr. Ambedkar. We described how Hindutva blood donation camps often work at a
slight  remove  but  always  related  to  projects  of  violence,  allowing  Hindutva
organizations to distance themselves from accusations of directly enacting violence.
Here  too,  blood—as a  substance of  sacrifice—carries  the  symbolic  capacity  to  make
meaningless the distinction between a politics of violence or of non-violence, writing
Hindutva  back  into  an  anti-colonial  history  with  which  it  is  not  otherwise  closely
associated.
50 Further,  with  the  onset  of  the  coronavirus  pandemic,  the  polarization  of  opinion
around the CAA began to map itself onto the carriers of the disease. At the beginning of
the epidemic,  the spread of  the virus was traced to a  gathering of  Tablighi  Jamaat
members.  The backlash from the media and the police was immediate.  Hashtags of
“coronajihad” were soon trending on social media, as were comparisons of the Jamaat
members with suicide bombers. In response, members in Tamil Nadu formed a Plasma
Tarteeb Jamat (Plasma Coordination Group) to donate their antibody rich blood plasma
for the purpose of treatment and research. The call for plasma donation came from
Maulana  Saad,  a  prominent  leader  of  the  movement  against  whom  the Delhi
government had filed charges of culpable homicide after the virus-spreading incident.
Crucially, a doctor at the forefront of the volunteering campaign insisted on clarifying
that  the  call  had  been  to  do  their  duty  as  good  citizens,  without  the  intent  of
recuperating  the  Jamaat’s  religious  image.  The  manager  of  the  Tablighi  Jamaat’s
Lucknow branch similarly emphasized that this was more a humanitarian rather than a
religious effort. The effort to donate was particularly striking as it took place during
the  month  of  Ramzan.  Jamaat  community  leaders  informed its  members  that  they
could make an exception and break their fast to donate blood, making up the lost day
later.46 By emphasizing their humanitarian duty,  their civic role as citizens,  and by
breaking religious protocols, the Jamaat sought to demonstrate its own flexibility and
philanthropic capability.
51 The  response  of  the  Tablighi  Jamaat  members  to  donate  their  antibody-rich  blood
plasma  must  be  understood  within  the  history  of  the  communalization  of  blood
donation we have traced in this paper. Recall our description of the editors of the Milli
Gazette’s response to Praveen Togadia’s claim that contemporary Indian Muslims had
betrayed an original unified blood-tie with their Hindu brethren by looking to Mecca.
The editors had responded in the same language of consanguinity, intending (contra
Togadia)  to  legitimize  religious  difference.  This  hematic  strategy  (of  consanguinity
indicating a common humanity without assimilating forms of difference) explains the
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maneuver of Jamaat members to assert their consanguinity with the nation without
relinquishing their religious identity.47
52 Further,  earlier  in  this  paper  we  described  how  Hindutva  organizations  sought  to
legitimize themselves as non-violent and philanthropically minded by organizing large
blood donations  camps.  They  did  so  while  simultaneously  accusing  Muslims  of  not
doing the  same.  The  act  of  the  Tablighi  Jamaat  members  must  also  be  understood
through the lens of this historical characterization. Like the Milli Gazette editors, they
too sought to re-establish a proper bio-moral relation between blood and community,
one founded on a conception of a shared humanity within which religious difference
remained legitimate. If the Milli Gazette editors recognized that this relation had come
under pressure after the Godhra massacre, the Jamaat members recognized that it had
come under further stress in the protests and counter-protests around the CAA. Their
gesture was a materialization of the editors’ call to recognize a common sanguinity that
did not necessarily dissolve legitimate religious difference. That is, if the editors of the
Gazette sought to establish a metaphorical consanguinity with their Hindu brethren,
the Jamaat’s actions generated material evidence (blood plasma) of a shared humanity.
 
Conclusion 
53 This paper has shown that if Hindutva’s ideologues look backwards to conceptualize an
essential continuity between Hindu nationalism and India as a territorial formation,
contemporary adherents materialize this conceptual work across present practices and
into an imagined future. For example, contemporary Hindutva actors work with blood
to establish a place for past ideologues in the anti-colonial struggle, establishing their
present  political  legitimacy.  This  history,  refigured through blood,  then recursively
becomes the grounds for Hindutva practices in the present. Present actors exteriorize
and circulate actual blood, entangling the conceptual and the material. Such material
deployments work in different ways for organizations across the Hindutva-spectrum.
For more radical groups blood works to valorize and precipitate violence. For those
that  present  mainstream  respectability,  deployments  of  blood  mediate  a  proximal
espousal of non-violence with a distal legitimization and participation in nationalist
violence.  Across  such  invocations,  the  violent  materiality  of  blood  is  offered  as  a
corrective  to  a  “secular”  historiography  alleged  as  biased  towards  Gandhian
nonviolence  and  the  Indian  National  Congress.  As  a  corrective,  past  Hindutva
ideologues  and  contemporary  activists  fuse  the  conceptual  and  the  material  to
precipitate  and threaten bloodshed against  ideological  non-adherents.  That  is,  they
recall prior bloodshed, in order to lay down a commitment to future bloodshed in the
cause of the (Hindu) nation. Present-day bleeding then becomes a way of sustaining the
vitality of a prior epoch, with all its connotations of affective and divisive nationalist
plenitude.
54 Our  effort  in  this  paper  has  been  to  examine  the  long  history  of  the  conceptual
invocations of  blood by various Hindutva ideologues and activists,  and the slippery
enactment of these invocations in political camps, art and blood banks. To be clear, we
do  not  argue  here  that  Hindutva  deployments  of  blood  are  the  pre-eminent
demonstration of the movement’s political imagination. Nor do we wish to claim that
the deployment of blood is specific to Hindutva’s brand of nationalism in the region.
Indeed,  elsewhere  we  track  its  lively  presence  amongst  those  directly  opposed  to
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Hindutva politics, as well as amongst the spectrum of Indian party politics (Copeman
2013b; Copeman and Banerjee 2019). Our more modest claim in the paper is this: blood
is a particularly useful entry-point for tracking Hindutva thought and practice because
the substance clarifies  with precision the effort  of  Hindutva actors  to  reframe and
rewrite Indian history and geography. In particular, thinking about Hindutva’s uses of
blood helps  to  describe  the  movement’s  ongoing search for  legitimacy,  its  slippery
relationship with the respectability of violence, and its effort to reconstruct India as a
homogenized territorial and historical formation. 
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NOTES
1. The authors would like to thank Nathaniel Roberts, the article reviewers, and the editorial and
production team at SAMAJ for their help and input. While this essay draws on and systematizes
some material presented in Copeman (2004, 2013a) and Copeman and Banerjee (2019) on blood
and Hindu nationalism, the majority of its material is presented for the first time and it develops
a wholly new argument.
2. More  broadly,  Sharma  contextualizes  Savarkar’s  imagination  as  part  of  a  broader  Hindu
nationalist movement to reconceptualize notions of substance purity and pollution in order to
re-emasculate Hindus supposedly enfeebled by past Muslim rule. 
3. The  RSS  is  a  radical,  ultranationalist  organization  founded  in  1925  by  Keshav  Baliram
Hedgewar. Present day Hindutva political parties look to the RSS for “moral guidance” and for
mobilizing their support base.
4. Cited in Times of India, October 19, 2000.
5. http://siafdu.tripod.com/fernandes.html 
6. Banguru Laxman, quoted in The Week, September 10, 2000. “Respect” afforded to Muslims due
to their supposed blood-tie with Hindus is additionally problematic because it is a “respect” that
exists “not because they are Muslims and believe in Islam but because, in a more fundamental
sense, they are not Muslims!” (Vanaik 1997:309). 
The Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) was founded in 1980 and is affiliated to right-
wing Hindu groups, principally the RSS. It headed the National Democratic Alliance coalition that
was ousted from office in the 2004 elections. It heads the current Indian government under the
leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
7. Outlook, November 22, 2002. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), founded in
1964, pursues a staunchly Hindutva-based agenda. 
8. Gazette Staff. 2002. “Interview: Dr Pravin Togadia.” Milli Gazette (vol. 3. no. 20), October 16-31.
Retrieved  on  October  30,  2020  (https://www.milligazette.com/Archives/
15102002/1510200233.htm).
9. See Rao, Ramesh, et. al., 2000: Chapter 2.
10. The HSS–the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh–is an RSS offshoot with a focus on Hindus in the
diaspora. On Hindu nationalist seva activities in diasporic contexts, see Zavos (2015). 
11. Of course, this is baseless, and it is not difficult to find counter examples. For example, when
in  September  2002  Islamic  militants  shot  dead twenty-eight  worshipers  at  the  Swaminaryan
temple in the Akshardham temple complex in Gandhinagar in Gujarat, the director of a local
blood bank drew attention to the many Muslims queuing to donate blood to help the Hindu
victims  (http://in.christiantoday.com/template/news_view.htm?code=gen&id).  On  the  other
hand, and also in Gujarat, soon after the extreme sectarian violence that engulfed the state in
2002, a blood bank in urgent need of blood went to a Hindu guru and was provided with 200
donations: “As the camp was finishing [the guru] told me his devotees had requested the blood go
only to Hindus. I said, No way!” (see Copeman 2009a:171).
12. See account in (Copeman 2009b:4–5).
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ABSTRACTS
In this article we examine blood as a medium and metaphor for Hindutva’s political transactions.
Specifically, we identify three ways in which blood operates in Hindutva thought and practice.
First, it serves to create a spatial geographic whole – an original Hindu nation whose inhabitants
share the same blood.  Second,  blood serves  to  mediate  between the violent  and non-violent
aspects  of  Hindu  nationalism,  authorizing  and  reconciling  present  acts  of  violence  with  a
supposed Hindu capacity for heroic restraint. And third, blood serves to establish a temporal
continuum between a Hindutva past, present and future, writing Hindu nationalist thought and
action backwards into Indian history, and forwards to threaten future bloodshed against non-
adherents. In these three ways, Hindutva imaginations and extractions of blood work through
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each other. In present-day India, these three political manifestations of blood – as a marker of
exclusion,  as  mediating  non-violence,  and as  premonitory  threat  –  have  all  appeared in  the
Citizenship Amendment Act controversy and around the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. As blood
overflows through time and space, it threatens to erase difference and legitimize violence while
further extending the ideology’s reach. 
INDEX
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